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PARADISE LOST-HOW THE GILMER
COURT LOST THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TO IMPROVE CIVIL RIGHTS
Lewis Maltby
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.'
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.2 decision marks a giant step in the growing trend of enforcing
" Director of the ACLU's National Taskforce on Civil Liberties in the Workplace;
ACLU Representative to the National Taskforce on Alternative Dispute Resolution
(1994-present); Adjunct Professor of Business, Temple University (1988-89); Executive
Vice-President and General Counsel, Drexelbook Engineering (1976-89); J.D. (1972),
B.A. (1969), University of Pennsylvania.
The author would like to thank Narda Jones for her significant research
assistance.
CHARLEs DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CaIEs 1 (1859).
2 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) hired Robert
Gilmer to be its manager of financial services in May of 1981. Id. at 23. Interstate
required Gilmer to register with various stock exchanges, including the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) as a condition of employment. Id. A clause in the NYSE registration
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agreements to arbitrate employment disputes, even when the dispute
involves a statutory claim.' Gilmer and the judicial disposition it
represents could be a blessing because it provides the average person,
for the first time in history, with meaningful access to justice when
he or she has a dispute with an employer.
The cost of litigating a typical employment dispute is now at
least $5,000 to $10,000. 4 This sum represents approximately six
months take-home pay for the average employee.' Most employment
disputes arise, however, when an employer has terminated an
employee.6 Without an income, an employee usually must struggle
with basic living expenses, and raising several thousand dollars for
an attorney is not possible.7
While a fortunate handful can avoid this problem through a
contingency fee agreement, the vast majority of cases do not have a
potential recovery large enough to induce an attorney to take this
application required Gilmer to submit any employment dispute with Interstate to
arbitration. Id. Interstate subsequently fired Gilmer in 1987. Id. Gilmer filed an age
discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, then brought
suit in a federal district court, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. at 23-24. Interstate moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to the NYSE registration application arbitration clause. Id. The
district court denied Interstate's motion, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding no
congressional intent to preclude arbitration in the ADEA. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196, 198-99 (4th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court affirmed
the Fourth Circuit's decision. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-29.
'See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 849, 888 (1994) (stating that "travel
costs, depositions, photocopying, expert witnesses, and similar costs can easily run into
the tens of thousands of dollars" in employment litigation).
I In 1993, the average weekly earnings, including full-time wages and salaries of
workers was $471-$11,304 in six months. Bureau of National Affairs, Reprint of
Article from Bureau of Labor Statistics' Monthly Labor Review, Issue Dated Feb. 1994,
DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 10, 1994, at d28.
See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
7 See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process:
The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
595, 595 (1973); Lorie Hearn, High Legal Fees Do Little Justice to Many in U.S., SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Jan. 3, 1994, at B1.
I Most labor and employment plaintiffs' attorneys bill on some type of contingency
fee arrangement. See Kenneth R. Plumb, Selecting a Labor and Employment Lawyer,
CoNN. LAW TRiB., June 27, 1994, at S18.
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risk. 9 Employees can, of course, proceed pro se,"° but their chances
of overcoming pretrial hurdles are virtually nil."1  The near
impossibility of a person with a dispute with his or her employer
getting a jury trial-combined with the financial barriers that most
employees experience in seeking adequate legal representation for
such problems-represents a serious flaw in our legal system. This
is illustrated by the fact that in California, only four percent of
employees who are wrongfully discharged obtain any form of judicial
relief.'2 Gilmer offers employees, for the first time in history, the
opportunity for a day in court that they can afford.
For all of its promise of correcting a significantly unjust legal
mechanism, Gilmer may actually worsen the problem by forcing
employees to take their complaints to tribunals that are no better than
kangaroo courts. This prospect is a very real possibility. While
some of the complaint resolution procedures that have been
voluntarily set up by employers are fair,13 others are not. In many
cases, an employee relies on a manager in the defendant-company to
rule on the conduct of another manager, with both managers knowing
that their roles may be reversed tomorrow. 4 This absence of a
9 According to a partner at a large employment law firm:
If I'm a plaintiff's lawyer sitting in my office, and you walk in and
describe your case to me, the first thing on my mind is, 'will I get
a fee for it?' Bear in mind the individual is most likely out of work
and probably can't afford my fee. Unless there is the possibility of
a substantive recovery, it doesn't pay to take the case.
Jay Finegan, Law and Disorder, INC., Apr. 1994, at 64. Most employment attorneys
are "exceedingly reluctant" to take a case on a purely contingent basis. See Michael P.
King, Contingency Fees in Discrimination Cases, N.J. LAWYER, Aug. 22, 1994, at 36.
"0 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1988) ("In all cases of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel .... "); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 321 (McKinney 1990) ("A party .. may prosecute or defend a civil
action in person or by attorney. ... ).
" For a discussion of the nearly insurmountable pretrial obstacles facing pro se
litigants in federal civil actions, see Julie M. Bradlow, Note, Procedural Due Process
Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1988).
2 See Lewis Maltby, The Decline of Employment at Will-A Quantitative Analysis,
LAB. L.J., Jan. 1990. at 52.
13 See ALAN F. WESTIN & ALRED G. FELU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
WITHOUT LrrIGATION 256-82 (1988) (describing currently used mechanisms that ensure
fairness in employment dispute arbitrations).
"' See, e.g., id. at 30-38.
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neutral decisionmaker results in a system that is unconscionably
inadequate and unfair.
The Gilmer Court, to its great discredit, did nothing to
prevent this result. While Justice White's majority opinion discusses
Gilmer's procedural claims,15 the analysis is superficial at best. The
Court found that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration
rules adequately protected Gilmer's rights,16 but a close examination
of these rules show that they are inadequate to ensure procedural
fairness in arbitration."
Gilmer argued that the arbitration agreement that he was
forced to sign was unfair because its provisions did not guarantee the
arbitrator's neutrality. 8 The Court responded to these concerns by
incorrectly concluding that NYSE Rules 608, 609, and 610
collectively ensure the neutrality of assigned arbitrators. 9 NYSE
Rule 608 requires that the parties to an arbitration be informed of the
ten year employment history of the arbitrator, at least eight days
before the initial arbitration hearing.20 NYSE Rule 609 states that
each party has the right to one peremptory challenge of an arbitrator
and unlimited challenges for cause. 2 Additionally, NYSE Rule 610
requires arbitrators to report any circumstance which might preclude
them from being objective to the arbitration director.22 The director
may remove the arbitrator from the assigned dispute.23 This removal
power is discretionary. 24
These rules do little to help an employee in Gilmer's position.
To begin with, there is no assurance that the pool of arbitrators
IS Gibner, 500 U.S. at 30-35.
16 Id. at 30-32.
17 See 2 New York Stock Exchange Const. & Rules (CCH) 2608-27 (Rules 608-
27) (1993) [hereinafter NYSE Rules].
"S Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
9 See id. at 30-31.
20 NYSE Rules 2608 (Rule 608).
21 Id. 2609 (Rule 609).
22 Id. 2610 (Rule 610(a)).
' Id. 2610 (Rule 610(c)).
24 Id.
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selected by NYSE is truly impartial to employees as a class.2" For
example, a pool composed entirely of brokerage house presidents
would rule in favor of employees less often than a pool composed of
rank and file employees. The NYSE rules fail to recognize or deal
with this problem.
The employee-plaintiff is also handicapped in evaluating any
individual arbitrator within the pool. While the proposed arbitrator's
employment history is of some use,26 parties are not given the far
more important decision histories of the assigned arbitrators. The
employer can usually afford the expensive research necessary to
obtain this information, but the employee cannot: A peremptory
challenge is useless if one has no information on which to base it.
Moreover, when the arbitrator reveals a conflict of interest,
the arbitration director has the option of disqualifying the arbitrator.28
Without mandatory disqualification in these circumstances, neutrality
is compromised. If the arbitrator thinks there is a conflict of interest
then one exists. There should be no debate or discretionary decision
making surrounding the conflict of interest issue.
Gilmer also argued that the NYSE Rules regarding discovery
were inadequate to protect his procedural rights.29 The Court relied
on NYSE Rules 619 and 620 to reject Gilmer's argument.30 NYSE
Rule 619 states that:
The parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent
practicable in the voluntary exchange of documents to
5 NYSE Rule 607 mandates that a "majority" of arbitrators shall not be from the
securities industry, unless "the public customer or non-member requests a panel
consisting of at least a majority from the securities industry." NYSE Rules 2607 (Rule
607(a)(1)). The Director of Arbitration determines who will serve on the arbitration
panel. Id. 2607 (Rule 607 (a)(2)(b)). Likewise, the Director fills any vacancies on
the panel that results during the course of the arbitration process. Id. 2611 (Rule 611).
I Each arbitrator is required to disclose: "(1) Any direct or indirect financial or
personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration; (2) Any existing or past financial,
business, professional, family or social relationships that are likely to affect impartiality
or might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias." Id. 2619 (Rule
610(a)).
21 See id.
SId. 2610 (Rule 610(c)).
29 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
3 Id.
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expedite the arbitration. Any request for dbcuments
or other information should be specific, relate to the
matter in controversy, and afford the party to whom
the request is made a reasonable period of time to
respond without interfering with the time set for the
hearing. 3
Rule 619 also grants arbitrators discretionary subpoena power to be
exercised when parties do not cooperate with discovery requests,
although the rules are vague on how arbitrators will enforce these
guidelines.32 Furthermore, no clear penalties result from a party's
refusal to comply with the subpoena or the voluntary discovery
request under the NYSE Rules."
Despite these shortcomings, the Gilmer Court found this to be
a procedurally sound discovery clause.34 The Court bolstered its
finding by relying on Rule 620, which states that arbitrators are not
bound by rules of evidence." The Court suggested that this would
compensate an employee who could not obtain evidence from an
uncooperative employer.3 6 The Court offered nothing, however, to
support this prediction.
Gilmer also argued that the entire arbitration proceeding was
unfair because the arbitration decisions are not made available to the
public." Gilmer asserted that the absence of public scrutiny leaves
the arbitrator's power unchecked, and the employer free to continue
its actionable behavior towards other employees.38 To counter this
assertion, the Gilmer Court pointed to NYSE Rule 627, which states,
in relevant part, that:
3 NYSE Rules 2619 (Rule 619(a)).
32 See id. 2619 (Rule 619(f)-(g)).
" See id.
' 500 U.S. at 31.
"' Id.; NYSE Rules 2620 (Rule 620) ("The arbitrators shall determine the
materiality and relevance of any evidence proffered and shall not be bound by rules
governing the admissibility of evidence.").
m See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
37 Id.
3' Gilmer argued that a lack of written opinions by arbitrators would result "in a lack
of public knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain
effective appellate review, and a stifling of the development of law." Id.
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(a) All awards shall be in writing and signed by a
majority of the arbitrators or in such a manner as is
required by law. Such awards may be entered as a
judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction ...
(f) The awards shall be made publicly available,
provided however, that the name of the customer
party to the arbitration will not be publicly available
if he or she so requests in writing.3 9
These clauses do not ensure public knowledge or scrutiny of
the arbitration proceedings. As noted above, NYSE Rule 627(f)
gives the employer the right to withdraw its name from the publicly
available records.4" Corporate entities who have lost the arbitration
proceeding will presumably exercise this right. By doing so, the
employer shields itself and the entire proceeding from public scrutiny.
The most serious deficiency in the NYSE system, however,
is the conflict of interest it creates for arbitrators. In a traditional
labor arbitration, the employee is represented by a union, which must
agree to the choice of arbitrator.'" An arbitrator whose decisions
consistently favor either side will not stay in business long.42 When
a nonunion employee submits his or her claim to arbitration,
however, this institutional memory is lost. The arbitrator is now in
a position where ruling for the employee may result in the loss of
future business. But there is no comparable risk in ruling for the
'9 id. at 31-32; NYSE Rules 2627 (Rule 627(a),(f)).
o NYSE Rules 2627 (Rule 627(0).
41 Under the vast majority of collective bargaining agreements, a union intercedes
on behalf of an employee after grievance procedures for dispute resolution have failed.
See Laurie A. Tribble, Note, Vacating Arbitrators' Awards Under the Public Policy
Exception: Are Courts Second-Guessing Arbitrators' Decisions?: Stroehmann Bakeries,
Inc. v. Local 776, International Brotherhoodof Teamsters, 38 VILL. L. REv. 1051, 1051
n.1 (1993). The union may demand that the dispute be submitted to arbitration. Id.
Once the dispute is submitted, both the union and the employer must agree to the
selection of the arbitrator. Id.
42 See Sharon Thatcher, Grievance Arbitration Awards: Where is the Interest in
Interest?, 8 LAB. LAW. 211, 218 (1992) ("Unlike judges, arbitrators must sell
themselves with every case in order to secure business from the parties in the future.
Good arbitrators, therefore, will make their decisions palatable as possible for the losing
party.").
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employer.43 In his rush to bless arbitration, Justice White completely
overlooked this fundamental problem.
Even more troubling is the suggestion that these inadequate
protections are not constitutionally required because this method of
arbitration was freely chosen by the parties." In the mind of Justice
White, the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act4 was to "place
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts. '",
Justice White was not concerned about inequality of bargaining
power. His opinion states that "[tihere is no indication in this case,
however, that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or
defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause. ",'
The reality is that Gilmer was required to accept NYSE
arbitration as a condition of employment.48 To have resisted
arbitration would have cost him his job. To imply that NYSE
arbitration was the mutual desire of the parties is naive at best. Nor
is the agreement to arbitrate just another contract. 49  It is an
agreement which waives important statutory rights.50 In some cases,
,3 "It is argued that since employers rather than individual employees are more likely
to have repeat participation in the employment dispute arbitration process, arbitrators are
more likely to rule in their favor in order to increase their chances of being selected to
arbitrate future claims." Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 U.
Mo.-KAN. CrrY L. REV. 693. 714 (1993); see Richard H. Block & Elizabeth A.
Barasch, Practical Ramifications of Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims,
§ 13.7.1, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNivERsrry, FORTY-FoURTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 298-99 (Bruno Stein ed. 1991) (discussing the potential bias of
industry arbitrators).
"See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33.
4 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
"Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
47 Id.
4' See id. at 24-35.
9 See id. at 39-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that arbitration agreements
are conditions of employment, not simply contracts).
" See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1973) ("Of
necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title
VII."). According to an employment law plaintiff's attorney: "It's not an issue of do
you support [arbitration]. The question is whether it is constitutional to make it
compulsory, . . . whether it is right for an employee [to] waive their [sic] Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury in order to get a job." Jorge Aquino, ADR at Work:
If it's Forced is it Fair?, RECORDER, July 20, 1994, at 1.
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these rights will be waived without the employee receiving anything
in return for the waiver.5" What is really at stake in cases like
Gilmer is the ability of an employer to require its employees to waive
statutory rights as a condition of employment.
The Supreme Court has traditionally taken a dim view of such
waivers. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,52 the Court stated:
"[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee's rights under Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964]. " Indeed, the very idea that an employer could refuse to hire
someone unless they consented to be fired because of their race or
gender would strike most management attorneys as too absurd to
consider. In certain contexts, the resistance to waivers goes even
further. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,' a
voluntary waiver of current rights in exchange for consideration is
not binding unless certain demanding requirements are met."
Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act56 prohibits any waiver
of rights prior to the filing of a claim.57
While intellectual consistency would require a similar
resistance to waivers of statutory rights in the context of agreements
to arbitrate, such an approach would not be best for employees. As
was discussed earlier, the economic hurdles facing employees often
render statutory rights useless." An arrangement in which employees
exchange some of their statutory rights for improved access to justice
might well improve their position. A jaundiced approach to waivers
"I In order to work for Interstate, for example, Gilmer had no choice but to register
with NYSE, thereby waiving his right to bring suit for employment disputes. See
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. The Supreme Court's recitation of the facts in the case did not
indicate that Gilmer received anything but a basic position from Interstate for this
waiver.
52 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
3 Id. at 51.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
5 See, e.g., Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (6th
Cir. 1986) (holding that waiver of an ADEA claim must be knowing and voluntary, in
accordance with contract principles).
1 42 U.S.C §§ 12001-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
" See, e.g., Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (D. Neb. 1993)
(holding that an ambiguous agreement to waive rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, made prior to litigation, and without attorney consultation, was invalid).
5s See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
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could end up hurting employees.
The best approach would be to allow waivers if they were
knowing and voluntary.59 If employers are able to devise alternatives
to civil litigation that employees genuinely prefer, the law should not
stand in the way. But the law should protect employees from being
forced to accept a remedy they consider inferior as a condition of
employment. Such a protective standard might well be workable in
practice. The financial obstacles that block access to justice are well
known.60 Given the alternative of a reasonable (if less than ideal)
remedy which they could afford, many employees might actually
choose it.
If the Court is not prepared to require employers to create
justice systems that employees prefer as a condition of upholding
waivers of statutory rights, the minimum it must do is create a floor
of due process protections that private arbitration systems must meet
before agreements to use them will be enforced." This Article will:
(1) explain why agreements to arbitrate employment disputes should
meet procedural due process minimums, and explain the
consequences of their absence; (2) explore the statutory authority that
mandates these minimums; and (3) set forth the procedures mandated
by a due process standard.
9 See, e.g., Rogers v. General Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986); Pilon v.
University of Minn., 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that waivers of Title VII
rights must be knowing and voluntary).
' See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). In Goss, the Supreme Court
stated:
'Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words
of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a
minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.'
Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
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II. Recognizing the Necessity of Procedural Due Process
Minimums in Employment Disputes: The Gilmer Court's
Glaring Failure and its Consequences
The Gilmer Court failed to establish what basic due process
procedures should be required for the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate employment disputes. There are several reasons why these
standards are necessary.
The most obvious consequence of not having a due process
standard apply to arbitrations in an employment context is that
nonunion employees who submit disputes with their employer to
arbitration receive an inadequate proportion of justice.62 This is in
contradistinction to the labor model where there are established
safeguards to protect against procedural improprieties, and to ensure
a just result.63 In labor arbitration, the employee is represented by
a union attorney.6 The union agrees to, and is often involved in, the
choice of arbitrator.65 The union pays part of the cost of the
arbitration." Although, generally there is no formal discovery in
arbitration,67 labor arbitrations are often guided by predetermined,
See Michael T. Sweeney, Employment Arbitration-Age Discrimination in
Employment Act-Arbitrability of Claims Under Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Upheld Pursuant to Arbitration Agreement-Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991), 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 540, 563 (1992) (concluding that
Gilmer failed to demonstrate a congressional intention to prevent arbitration of ADEA
claims).
0 See Edward Brunet, Arbitration & Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 95
(1992) (stating that in a labor model there is a long term relationship between labor and
management which needs to be protected and that, therefore, it is in both parties' interest
that the results be fair and just).
' See Andrew J. Kahn, Problems of Professional Ethics in Labor Law, 1987 DET.
C.L. REv. 731, 738 (1987).
' See general& id. (noting that "union attorneys are often involved at all steps of"
the arbitration process).
' See David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisted, 37 ST. LouIs U.
L.J. 973, 1002 (1993) (proposing a clause in a draft collective bargaining agreement
which mandates that "the Employer and the Union shall each pay one-half the costs of
arbitration").
6' See Laura J. Cooper, Discovery in Labor Arbitration, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1281,
1299 (1988) (stating that "national labor policy favors interpreting the [Federal] Rules
to prevent use of federal court discovery devices in" an arbitration setting).
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often contractual, rules of discovery,68 and arbitration opinions are
published.69 These safeguards are not guaranteed in private nonunion
arbitration.
In nonorganized labor arbitrations, the employee usually will
not have an attorney unless the employee individually seeks out and
retains one-something most employees cannot afford to do.70
Furthermore, there is no guarantee of a neutral arbitrator, and no
protection from the risk that the pool of arbitrators will be
ideologically biased against the employee.7" This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that the employer bears the entire cost of the
arbitrator's fees and other costs connected with arbitration.72
Therefore, even if the arbitrator is impartial, an economic interest in
repeat business will create an inherent conflict of interest that works
against the employee.73
Indeed, if there are no limits on an employer's discretion in
designing an arbitration system, any employer with even the slightest
imagination will be able to design a system in which employees never
win. Imagine a system in which the arbitrator is a subordinate of the
manager who made the decision to terminate, or in which the
arbitrator is a company manager who has been told by top
management that any decisions in favor of employees will result in
his or her own termination. What the Gilmer Court failed to
understand is that taking away procedural rights denies substantive
rights as well. If employers are allowed unlimited discretion to shape
private arbitration to their own advantage, the Supreme Court will
s See id.
9 See Brunet, supra note 63, at 120.
70 See generally Lea S. VanderVelde, Making Good on Vaca's Promise:
Apportioning Back Pay to Achieve Remedial Goals, 32 UCLA L. REv. 302, 328 n.111
(1984) (stating that "'[aittorney fees have dramatically increased during the past several
years preventing many discharged employees from seeking relief because they need
counsel at the moment when their income has been cut off.'" (quoting Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 249, 253 (1983))).
71 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
I See Blumrosen, supra note 70, at 262 (stating that "in individual arbitration ...
it is appropriate that the employer pay the arbitrator").
71 But see id. (stating that when an employer pays the arbitrator, "[tihe risk of an
arbitrator leaning toward the employer may be addressed in other ways, such as
requiring publication of written opinions and the emergence of a 'plaintiff's bar"').
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have blessed what it considered in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.74 to be unthinkable-the surrender of federal statutory rights as
a condition of employment."
Despite these difficulties, an increasing number of
employment disputes are being resolved in the arbitration forum. In
the recent past, federal courts have held that employment agreements
to arbitrate claims arising under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act are enforceable.76 Federal courts have also upheld
arbitration agreements for claims under the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act" and the Federal Railroad Safety Act." Federal courts
have considered whether to enforce agreements to arbitrate Title VII
claims. Most courts have followed Gilmer, and have enforced these
agreements.7 9 Only a minority of federal courts refuse to enforce
agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims."0
While the courts have been enthusiastic about enforcing
agreements to arbitrate,"1 they have not shown much interest in
insuring that arbitrations are fair. The present attitude of courts
construing the Federal Arbitration Act is that arbitration awards are
final, and that the courts should not, except in very unusual cases,
7 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
5 See id. at 60.
76 See, e.g., Bird v. Shearson Lehman, 926 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991); Fabian Fin. Services v. Kurt H. Volk, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan, 768 F. Supp. 728, 724 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
7' 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988); see, e.g., Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham
& Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992).
7s 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-445 (1988); see, e.g., Springfield Terminal Rwy. Co. v. United
Transp. Union, 767 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D. Me. 1991).
79 See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir.
1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman, 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939
F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
'0 See, e.g., Kaliden v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. Pa.
1991).
sI See, e.g., Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the Virginia Motor Vehicle License Act, which forbids binding arbitration
agreements, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act).
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permit post-arbitration review.
82
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration awards
can be set aside or vacated because of fraud, corruption, or undue
means.83 While the phrase "undue means" is capable of covering a
broad range of arbitral errors, its actual construction has been
exceedingly narrow. For example, an arbitration award will not be
set aside because the arbitrator committed an error of law." This
rule is not limited to peripheral issues, or to legal judgment calls
where reasonable minds could reach different results. Even clear
errors of law, which change the outcome of the case, are immune
from judicial correction unless they evidence "a manifest disregard
for law. "8 Failure of an arbitration panel to follow its own rules has
likewise been excused by the courts." While it is obviously
important to protect against arbitration awards procured through
bribery, coercion, or an arbitrator's deliberate refusal to follow the
law, such a standard is incapable of guaranteeing an acceptable level
of fairness. Even the kangaroo court previously described, in which
the arbitrator was the subordinate of the manager who made the
contested decision, would find approval under this standard.
Moreover, even in the few cases where the fraud standard can be
met, the employee must demonstrate that fraud was committed by
presenting clear and convincing evidence.87 The end result is that
arbitration awards, for all intents and purposes, are final.
These circumstances leave the employee in an untenable
position. The employer's arbitration system may be completely
unfair, and yet the employee does not have a bargaining position that
enables him or her to refuse to accept this system, or even to modify
82 See COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE, Mar. 17, 1993 (stating that the
Federal Arbitration Act does permit an award to be rejected on very narrow grounds,
such as corruption or fraud involving arbitration).
" 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
81 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986).
" See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.
1991); Greenfield v. Mosley, 247 Cal. Rptr. 314, 321 (Ct. App. 1988).
86 See Antwine v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 899 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1990).
See Bonan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988).
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it in order to make it fair.88 And the federal courts will not protect
the employee.
This is simply unacceptable. Our country has worked long
and hard to protect its citizens from certain abuses, including
discrimination based on race, gender, age, and other illegitimate
factors."' We cannot let these rights be stripped away by coerced
agreements to submit disputes to tribunals that are inherently biased
against employees. If federal courts are to enforce employer
requirements that employees submit disputes to the employers' private
court systems, they have a responsibility to insure that these private
systems are fair.
III. Authority for These Procedural
Due Process Minimums
The courts' responsibility to insure a fair arbitration system
is supported by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).' "Its purpose
was to reverse the long-standing judicial hostility to arbitration...
that had existed in . . . common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration . . .[on] the same footing
as other contracts. 9  Section 10 of the FAA states, in relevant part,
that:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States
8 See generally Blumrosen, supra note 70, at 254 (stating that "the employer and
its lawyers have a comparatively free hand in drafting the details of an arbitration
clause").
"9 See, e.g., JEB v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994) (holding that gender-
based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause); Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76 (1979) (determining that gender-based classifications in a provision of the
Social Security Act could not survive strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (concluding that segregation of children
in public schools solely on the basis of race is prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause).
Io The FAA was originally enacted in 1925, Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No.
103-325, 1925 U.S.C.C.A.N. (43 Stat.) 833, and then re-enacted in 1947, Act of July
30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. (47 Stat.) 1515 (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988)).
"I Gibner, 500 U.S. at 24.
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court in and for the district wherein the award was
made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption
fraud or undue means.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced.92
These sections of the FAA mandate the implementation of due
process minimums.93
Edward Brunet states that "the phrase 'undue means' could be
read more expansively but still consistently with its plain meaning.
These words focus clearly on procedure. They invite a court to
examine the arbitral procedure broadly. "' The FAA plainly requires
judges to look for procedural irregularities.9" Procedural
inconsistencies are only evident in the framework of a due process
standard.96  Therefore, a correct procedural model must be
constructed and applied to arbitrations falling under the FAA.
Brunet further suggests that § 10(a)(3)'s reference to parties'
"rights" can only be a reference to constitutional rights because no
other "rights" could be interpreted to exist in the context of a federal
statute.97 Taken together, the statute's "undue influence"98 and
"rights" language99 points to the conclusion that constitutional
procedural due process minimums are required in arbitrati6ns falling
9' 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) (emphasis added).
" See Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1430 (1990).
' Brunet, supra note 63, at 113.
9' See id. at 114.
' See id. at 89-96.
9' Id. at 114-15.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1988).
SId. § 10(c).
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under the FAA.
Having determined the legal necessity of these minimums, the
next step is to determine their scope. The FAA framers di)not
define procedural due process.100 Instead, they deliberately chose
vague terms like "undue influence" and "rights" to reflect their desire
that procedural minimums be applied to FAA arbitrations.' 0' The
vagueness of the terms makes them forever adaptable to
contemporary notions of fairness and predictability, which are the
touchstones of procedural due process.
The undue influence and rights language guides us in
constructing the correct minimum standards. At the pinnacle of
procedural due process are exhaustive requirements similar to those
connected with a judicial proceeding. At the base of this structure is
the complete absence of any required procedures.
In the context of arbitrations, undue influence could be
defined as anything that creates inequities between the parties or bears
on the objective nature of the proceedings. Because parties have a
right to have awards that were procured by undue influence
vacated," ° they also have a right to the absence of undue influence. 0 3
Fair procedures are mandated. Full trial procedures go beyond what
is needed to insure objectivity and equity in an arbitration setting.
Conversely, the absence of any procedural requirements applied to
arbitrations virtually ensures that the proceedings will not be fair.
The correct intermediate standard is the one that ensures fair and
predictable procedures without compromising the independence and
expediency of arbitration. The standard set forth below meets this
requirement.
IV. The Due Process Standard
Procedural due process can be established only when there is
'o See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
o See Brunet, supra note 63, at 115-17.
'o 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1988).
103 See id.
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an impartial and seasoned arbitrator" both parties have advance
notice of the issues,'0 5 the employee has representation comparable to
theqpmployer, and the employee has the right to some limited
enforceable discovery.1 °6 Before a court enforces an employment
agreement to arbitrate workplace disputes, the court must scrutinize




The most important requirement for due process is also the
most difficult to accomplish. The arbitrator is both judge and jury,"0 8
and the arbitration decision is effectively insulated from appellate
review.10 9 Therefore, it is absolutely imperative that arbitrators be
completely impartial.
In traditional labor arbitration, the employee is represented by
a union which must agree to the choice of arbitrators.110 An
arbitrator whose decisions consistently favor either side will not stay
104 See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307-09 (1986) (stating
that "the original union procedure was . .. defective because it did not provide for a
reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision-maker").
1o See, e.g., Jolly v. Listerman, 672 F.2d 935, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1982); McDaniels
v. Flick, No. Civ. A.92-0932, 1993 WL 171270 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1993); Olson v.
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-63 (D. Minn. 1969).
106 See, e.g., Deborah Masucci& Robert S. Clemente, Securities Arbitration at Self-
Regulatory Organizations: New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Administration & Procedures, 851 PLI/Corp 47 (1994) available
in WESTLAW, Tp-all Database (stating that "parties may agree to the use of depositions
or interrogatories in arbitration" but "the costly and often abusive forms of discovery are
generally not permitted").
07 See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 139 v. Carl
A. Morse, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 153, 157 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
" See Corbin v. Washington Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 393, 396 n.10
(D.S.C. 1968). The Corbin court "described arbitrators as 'judges, jurors and
chancellors in the case,"' and added that they "'possess all the powers which come
within the province, or compass of these respective functionaries."' Id. (quoting Mulder
v. Cravat, 2 Bay 370, 372 (1802)).
109 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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in business long."' When nonorganized employees submit their
disputes to arbitration, they are at a disadvantage. Unlike union
employees, they do not have the ability or the resources to investigate
the track record of a proposed arbitrator." 2 The arbitrator knows
this, and is also aware that the employer's resources will support the
investigation. This disparity in resources creates a conflict of interest
for the arbitrator because the arbitrator's economic incentive is now
to rule for the employer.
It is possible that a nonprofit group could start collecting track
records of individual arbitrators, the way unions currently do, and
provide the information to arbitrating parties.t 3 Unions themselves
might make this service available to nonmembers." 4 It would cost
them very little to share this information, because they are already
collecting it for their own arbitrations. Additionally, sharing this
information could be a valuable source of revenue and goodwill.
Alternately, a for-profit organization could collect this information
and sell it to arbitrating parties, although it is not clear that such an
arrangement is commercially viable. Professional arbitration
organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association,"' should
also have some obligation to provide such information.
This approach, however, is not likely to produce acceptable
results. To begin with, the effectiveness of the methods described
above, which attempt to duplicate the institutional memory provided
by unions in traditional arbitration, is speculative. None of them
exists, even in a rudimentary form, and the theoretical arguments that
', See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
2 See generally Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights:
Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457,546 (1992) (stating that
"individual employees, acting alone, lack the information, resources, and psychological
support to readily assert their rights against employers who dominate their work life").
113 See generally Jacob P. Hart & David W. Wolf, Grievance Arbitration-Some
Hints on Arbitrator Selection, Preparation, and Trial, R176 ALI-ABA 1401, 1417-26
(1992). The American Arbitration Association keeps lists of arbitrators, which are sent
to the parties of an arbitration. See id.
See id. (stating that unions have information on arbitrators' previous experiences
on file).
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,
487 n.22 (1988) (noting that the American Arbitration Association "is a nonprofit public
service organization that promotes voluntary resolution of disputes through arbitration
and mediation").
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predict their creation are far from compelling.
But even if decisional histories were readily available, the
inequality would remain. Evaluating decisional histories is a
complicated and subtle process. Even attorneys often find it difficult
unless they are experienced in the world of arbitration. A pro se
litigant is simply not in a position to undertake this task." 6
How then is the conflict of interest to be avoided? One
possible method would be for the arbitration systems themselves to
review decisional histories, and remove arbitrators from the pool
when they show systematic bias. This solution, however, is not only
unworkable, but also poses the threat of worsening the problem.
First, this approach can only be applied to independent arbitration
systems such as the American Arbitration Association."11 It is of no
use in arbitration systems maintained by a single company, where it
is most needed.
But even when applied to neutral arbitration systems,
removing arbitrators from the pool based on decisional histories is
undesirable. It is virtually impossible to determine objectively what
constitutes systematic bias. In the real world, no arbitrator is going
to rule for employers 100% of the time. To be sure, some arbitrators
will rule for employers in a majority of cases. But is this evidence
of bias, or merely a reflection of the merits of the cases he or she
was assigned? While it may be true that neither side is right all of
the time, it is highly unlikely that employees are right in exactly fifty
percent of the cases filed. It is almost inconceivable that this would
be true in the small sample of the total cases assigned to an individual
arbitrator.
One could theoretically construct a calculus in which a
decisional history's distribution would have to be within a specified
number of standard deviations from the mean, but this would be
either unfair or meaningless. The impact of conflict of interest is too
,16 See generally David E. Robbins, Securities Arbitration Procedure and Case
Evaluation, C879 ALI-ABA 401, 435 (1993) available in WESTLAW, Tp-all Database.
This author notes that pro se "claimants are rarely able to distinguish an opening
statement from their case-in-chief and have no skills whatsoever in the art of cross-
examination." Id. Likewise, it would be impossible for them to evaluate decisional
histories.
" See William M. Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration,
48 ARB. J. 27, 35-36 (1993).
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subtle and too complex to be detected by this form of statistical
analysis. And the attempt would destroy the most valuable asset of
arbitrators-their independence. Instead of concentrating on the
merits of individual cases, the arbitrator would have to begin
considering how a particular decision would affect his or her profile.
The resulting unfairness would probably exceed that produced by the
conflict of interest at which it was aimed.
A better answer is to remove the choice of arbitrators from
the parties. If the parties had to accept the arbitrator assigned by the
arbitration association, individual arbitrators would have no incentive
to rule for the employer to increase their repeat business.
Many would object to this procedure. Those who use
arbitration are understandably happy with the security and flexibility
of the current practice. But the ability to choose one's "judge" is not
an indispensable aspect of justice. Litigants in federal court generally
have no part in selecting the judge that is assigned to their case. 1 8
Few, if any, consider this unfair. Why, then, should we object to a
similar system for arbitration, especially when it may be the only way
to avoid systematic unfairness?
Another procedural problem remains to be solved. The most
even-handed system of selecting arbitrators from a pool is useless if
the method of selecting arbitrators for the pool is biased. A pool
composed entirely of corporate CEOs would surely decide for
employers more often than one composed of union officials. Before
a court can legitimately defer to the decision of an arbitrator, it must
know that the pool from which the arbitrator was chosen was not
biased.
This is not so great a departure from past practice as it might
appear. Courts have dealt for years with challenges to jury verdicts
based on bias in the manner in which the jury pools were selected. 1 9
Where systematic bias has been shown, verdicts have been reversed,
despite the lack of any demonstrable bias on the part of individual
118 See, e.g., Riojas v. Turner, 304 F. Supp. 559, 560 (D. Utah 1969) (discussing
a Tenth Circuit rule which provides for automatic assignment of cases between judges).
The Riojas court stated that "litigants cannot select the judges they wish to decide their
cases any more than the judges could select even if they were so inclined." Id.
"" See, e.g., United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing a
defendant's contention that exclusion of 18 to 22 year old individuals and those with
extensive prior jury service from the venire was prejudicial).
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jurors.1 20 The same principles and practices apply equally well to
arbitration.
B. Seasoned Arbitrator
Arbitrators must be familiar with the world of employment
and employment disputes. 121 Arbitrators are not only judge and jury,
they are a jury of one. They must make difficult factual decisions
alone, without benefit of the observations and experiences of others.
This is vastly different from the dynamics of a jury, whose collective
experience and common sense combine to produce a result far better
than any individual member of the jury could have produced alone.
The arbitrator must generally do this with a factual record which is
much less developed than the one with which a jury typically has to
work.
For arbitrators to play such a demanding role well, it is not
enough that they be intelligent and familiar with the applicable law.
They must also understand the world about which they are making
decisions.' They must have a "common sense" of how industry
works, and how employment decisions are made against which to
compare the testimony they hear.123  Otherwise, they will be as
helpless as an American judge or jury trying to resolve a factual
dispute in Tierra del Fuego.
Practiced management attorneys and union-side labor
attorneys are the most obviously qualified pools from which to draw
a seasoned arbitrator. There are also many nonattorney professionals
who acquire the requisite exposure to workplace disputes during the
course of their employment. The list of experienced nonattorneys
includes National Labor Relations Board agents, Equal Employment
120 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
'21 See generally Yaroslav Sochynsky, No Alternative to Understanding the Law,
RECORDER, Aug. 23, 1993, at 8 (stating that there are minimum requirements for
arbitrators; for example, in a real estate case, the arbitrator should have experience in
real estate law).
'22 See Stephen L. Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB.
J. 8, 11 (1993) (stating that an arbitrator "need not be especially conversant with the
substantive law but must have the ability to skillfully steer the process").
'23 See id.
1994] ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 23
Opportunity Commission or state human rights division investigators,
corporate managers, personnel administrators, union officials, and
Legal Services or Legal Aid paralegals who have worked in employee
benefits. 124
The definition of a seasoned arbitrator, essential as it is to due
process, is difficult to construct, although a good rule of thumb might
be that a person should have at least five years of direct involvement
in employment disputes before being considered as an arbitrator. 125
C. Advance Notice of the Issues
It is a fundamental concept of due process that parties need
advance notice of issues in order to properly prepare their
arguments.' 26 This is of particular importance when the employee is
the defendant.'27 An employee first learning of employer charges at
arbitration proceedings has no time to gather witnesses, construct an
explanation, or conduct adequate discovery. Without this evidence,
an employee has no way of defending against these charges.
124 See Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration
in Employment Disputes, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 254 (1993).
11 See generally Garry G. Mathiason & Pavneet S. Uppal, Evaluating and Using
Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the
Twenty-First Century, C902 ALI-ABA 875, 895 (1994) available in WESTLAW, Tp-all
Database (advocating 10 years of experience in studying workplace disputes for
arbitrators); Sochynsky, supra note 122, at 8 (stating that in a real estate contract case,
an arbitrator should have at least 10 years experience in real estate law).
1 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967) (requiring sufficient advance notice to
satisfy constitutional requirements in a civil or criminal proceeding; timely advance
notice of a hearing must also provide details of the specific issues that are to be
addressed).
"27 See generally Helms v. Rafter, 853 F. Supp. 897, 903 (W.D.N.C. 1994) (stating
that to satisfy due process, the employee must receive "oral written notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present
his side of the story").
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D. Availability of Discovery Including
Compulsory Participation of Corporate Witnesses
In most cases, the critical evidence is in corporate records or
in the minds of other corporate employees. 2 The employee must
have access to this evidence if the system is to be deemed fair.
E. Right of Comparable Representation
Any fair system of justice requires that the opposing parties
have roughly comparable counsel. 129 An employee proceeding pro se
has little chance against an experienced attorney." 0 There are two
ways this mismatch can be avoided. One is for the employer to bear
the costs of the employee's counsel where the employee is unable to
do so. The other is for the employer to be represented by someone
comparable to the employee's representative. If a rank and file
employee is proceeding pro se, the appropriate employer
representative would be the employee's immediate supervisor. Where
the employee is a manager or professional-or is represented by a
nonlawyer advocate-the employer should be represented by a human
relations professional.
Even this will not completely level the playing field. In each
of these confrontations, the employer will generally have the upper
hand. Even where both sides have attorneys, an employer with its
deeper pockets will still be able to hire someone more experienced. 3'
All this admittedly unconventional approach accomplishes is to
prevent the disparity between employer and employee representation
from overwhelming the merits of the case.
' See generally Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment
Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1128 (1982) (stating that corporate
defendants have greater access to information held by other employees or company
records).
129 See Bradlow, supra note 11, at 675 (explaining how indigent defendants have a
right to be represented by legal counsel, even if they cannot afford it).
"S0 See id. at 670.
131 See id.
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F. Judicial Review
Judicial review should be limited to situations where there is
evidence of partiality or of the arbitrators exceeded their authority by
deciding an issue not properly before them. Putting procedural due
process minimums in place would decrease the need for more
extensive judicial review. More rigorous judicial review is
undesirable. In fact, intensive judicial review would undermine the
independence and cost-effectiveness of the arbitration system.32
The single greatest problem of an employee in litigation with
a major corporation is cost.133 Countless times we have seen the
costs of litigation scare off meritorious claims, and watched
employers wait until the plaintiff is financially exhausted and then
settle a case for a fraction of its true value.134 Arbitration addresses
this problem by providing a final decision in an affordable tribunal. 35
This solution is diluted if the wealthier party can afford to initiate
expensive judicial review.136 If arbitration is to fulfill its promise of
putting the individual on a reasonably equal footing with large
organizations, the arbitrator's decision must be final in most cases.
G. The Effect of the Proposed Due Process Standard
The minimum due process standards just described would not
turn arbitrations into the kind of complex procedures they were
3 See Mitchell J. Benowitz, Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen: Arbitration and
Punitive Damages, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1145, 1146 n. 10 (1986) (stating that "court review
of the award defeats the goal of avoiding litigation through arbitration and undermines
the parties confidence in arbitration as an effective and final means of dispute
resolution").
" See Christopher E. Austin, Due Process, Court Access and Fees and the Right
to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 768 (1982) (stating that the right to litigate is restricted
by various fees, such as filing fees, service or notice costs, and sometimes prosecution
bonds).
'3' See id.
135 See Benowitz, supra note 132, at 1156 (commenting that legislative endorsement
of arbitration indicates confidence in the process).
11 See id. at 1153 (referring to the necessity of upholding arbitration awards to
prevent discouraged parties from demanding a separate trial).
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designed to avoid. For example, only minimal discovery is
appropriate. The scope of discovery would remain in the discretion
of the arbitrator. In many cases, discovery might be limited to the
depositions of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's supervisor, and the
production of the personnel file. Note also the lack of any
requirement of findings of fact and conclusions of law, or indeed for
any written report. Nor does the list include judicial review.
Some would charge that streamlining the arbitration process
will render arbitration incapable of producing justice. 137 But justice
does not reside in elaborate procedural rules.138  Human rights
attorneys in totalitarian countries know well that procedural due
process means nothing when the tribunal has reached its decision
before the trial opens. '39 Recent experience with arbitration and small
claims courts has shown that a fair decisionmaker can generally do
justice with a minimum of formal processes. Indeed, many of our
traditional due process protections, especially in criminal law, are
attempts to make up for bias on the part of the tribunal. '40 This does
not mean that formal procedures have no value in the search for
justice, only that they are not absolute requirements."4 "
This is particularly true in employment disputes. In large and
complex cases where there are hundreds of factual disputes and reams
of relevant documents, protracted discovery is often essential. The
typical employment dispute, by contrast, generally involves the single
question of the reason the employer terminated (or otherwise
disadvantaged) a single employee. The relevant information is
confined to a handful of people, all of whom are known to both
sides, and a few documents, most of which are in the employee's
personnel file. In such cases, protracted discovery is not nearly so
important. A similar situation exists with regard to motion practice.
'" See id. at 1152.
" See id.
131 See John S. Gibson, International Human Rights Law: Progression of Sources,
Agencies and Law, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 41 (1990).
11 See William R. Tapella, Constitutional Law/Due Process/Judicial Admonitions,
81 ILL. B.J. 605, 605 (1993) (arguing that an admonition by a judge violates the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process if, under the circumstances,. it
could have affected the witness's decision not to testify, it was improper, and the
witness's testimony would have affected the verdict in the case).
'll See Gilner, 500 U.S. at 20.
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In a case with numerous complex and interrelated legal issues,
motions and supporting briefs are necessary.1 42  The typical
employment case, however, does not fit this mold. The core
provisions of most federal civil rights laws are well developed and
understood today, and cases turn far more on the factual question of
the employer's real motivation for its actions than on fine points of
statutory construction.
1 4
All this, however, demonstrates only that certain procedures
are not as important as the fairness of the arbitrator. The steps which
this model omits will always have some value, and in some cases it
will be substantial. They are left out, not because they are without
value, but because of their cost.
Americans have always had difficulty thinking about cost
where important values are concerned. We cannot bring ourselves
to think about rationing health care.'44 Our belief in the importance
of human life makes this process too painful. But our sensitivity does
not make our resource limitations disappear. The result is that health
care is still rationed, but in ways that are less rational and less
humane than if we had confronted the issue directly.
1 41
We have done much the same with our justice system. Our
desire to ensure that every case is decided fairly has lead us to add
layer upon layer of procedural complexity. We now have the
judicial equivalent of a Rolls Royce, a marvelous vehicle whose sole
imperfection is that it is so expensive that almost no one can afford
to drive one, and most people end up walking. We seem to be
incapable of reversing this process in the civil justice system itself.
147
The least we can do is endeavor not to repeat this mistake in our
rules for arbitration. While we must be sure arbitration includes the
features that are necessary to produce justice in most cases, we
142 See Bradlow, supra note 11, at 659.
143 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(holding that the employer has the burden to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for
firing an employee).
'" See Richard D. Lamm, Rationing of Health Care: Inevitable and Desirable, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 1151 (1992) (stating that increasing access to health care would increase
the number of people who would suffer negligent injuries).
'4' See id. at 1151.
1" See Bradlow, supra note 11, at 659.
147 Id.
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cannot let our desire for perfection persuade us to add desirable, but
nonessential, features whose cost denies access to justice for those
who need it most. If both sides of a dispute have advance knowledge
of the issues, access to the relevant evidence, and the opportunity to
present their side of the issue to an impartial tribunal, then justice
will generally be done. This is not perfection, but it is a fair result
of which we should not be ashamed, and one which is far better than
our current situation.
The proposed requirements could also be attacked as being
beyond the legitimate scope of the federal judiciary. 48 Private
arbitration systems are not creatures of the state. The government
has no inherent right to govern how they choose to operate, and
certainly no right to impose the admittedly sweeping changes outlined
here. 1
49
Federal courts do, however, have the right and the obligation
to enforce federal statutory rights.150 While a private arbitration
system has the right to conduct its proceedings any way it chooses,
it does not have the right to insist that the courts blindly accept its
decisions where statutory rights are concerned. The courts have
every right to determine the scope of judicial review of arbitration
decisions.'51 Before the courts agree to enforce arbitration decisions
without de novo review, they can and must insist that the arbitration
system adequately protects statutory rights.
V. Conclusion
The trend toward settling employment disputes, even those
involving federal civil rights, in private arbitration is real, large, and
irreversible. The question today is not whether this trend will
continue, or whether the federal courts will allow it to continue. The
question is whether private arbitration will become a fair and
1 For a discussion of the degree of importance of a private final arbitration
decision, see Bret F. Randall, The History, Application and Policy of the Judicially
Created Standard of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759 (1992).
'9 See id.
ISO See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
SId.
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reasonable alternative to the civil courts which the average person can
afford, or whether it will become a corporate coliseum that
employees will be forced into like so many early Christians, and with
equal chance of success.
Cases such as Gilmer present the federal judiciary with the
opportunity to insure that arbitration does not become the graveyard
of employees' civil rights. The Supreme Court squandered this
opportunity in Gilmer. It must do better the next time the issue is
presented.

